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Abstract
The Chinese real estate market has undergone rapid growth within the past decade.
Although the growth of the real estate market has helped the Chinese economy, there are many
underlying problems to such a hurried rate of growth. This paper briefly looks at the background
of the real estate market leading up to the current situation, and then discusses some of the
potential problems and government responses.
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Background
Arguably the current Chinese real estate market conditions can be traced back to change
in government policies. Before 1998 the Chinese government controlled the distribution of
properties3 and the real estate market itself only played a secondary role. The real estate market
operated under “dual tracks" in which both government control and market mechanics existed.
Mortgages did not exist for individuals. People working for government-owned enterprises,
which were dominant before 1998, were provided with a residence at prices significantly lower
than market prices due to subsidies from their employers. In July of 1998, real estate became
commercialized through reform policies. Local governments have established programs to sell
real estate to people instead of providing them with housing as part of employment benefits.

With this policy change, consumers’ perception of the real estate market changed
drastically. Before 1998, real estate was mainly perceived as something of practical value, but
never as investments since individuals could not buy or sell freely. After the reforms in 1998,
people’s perception of real estate shifted from something purely practical to an attractive channel
of investment. There was a lag between the time the real estate market became commercialized
and when the masses started investing in real estate. From 1998 to 2003, real estate prices only
increased 3.5% annually, while personal income per capita increased at a much higher 9.5%
annually. Roughly starting in 2002 many people viewed the real estate market as a good
investment, and many started pouring their money into it.

3
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Perhaps the most important reason why Chinese investors rush to the real estate market is
because there are limited ways to invest in China. China’s stock market capitalization as a
percentage of its GDP has consistently been lower than the world average and much lower than
that of the United States (Figure 1 and Table 1). In Figure 1, China’s market capitalization
expressed as a percentage of its GDP has been lower than the average market capitalization in
percentage of GDP of the world every year since 1998 until 2006, and has been lower than the
same measurement in the United States every year since 1998 except 20074. In years 2006-2009,
the percentage of market capitalization to GDP jumped almost threefold from 34.6% in 2005 to
89.3% in 2006. This percentage in 2007 also increased drastically by almost doubling: 177.6%
in 2007 compared to the figure in 2006. Conventional wisdom dictates investors either invest in
the real estate market or the stock market. Interestingly, although the Chinese stock market grew
dramatically in 2006 and 2007, the Chinese real estate prices did not experience drops of similar
magnitudes in those years.

Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) started
operating in 1990. Initially after their inception, the two grew quickly for about a decade,
continuing through the 1990s to the end of 2000, where the market peaked. The market then
reversed for the next five years and lost half of its market capitalization. This downward turn of
the overall market coincided with the furious growth of the real estate market, which grew
rapidly between 2002 and 2006. This could be because after 2000 when the 1990’s bull market
4
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ended, investors started to look for alternatives investments. By then the perception change in
consumers have caught up with the investors, hence they began investing heavily in real estate.

China’s bond market is also underdeveloped. There are several possible reasons for this.
As a developing country, China has not developed sound accounting or auditing systems, and
there are no high-quality bond-rating agencies. Like most other emerging countries, China has
low creditor protection and an inefficient legal system, which means the chances for bondholder
recovery in the event of default is slim to none. This in turn leads to under-investment in the
bond market by both domestic and foreign investors. Lack of a well-constructed yield curve is
another important factor for China, given the small size of publically traded Treasury bond
market and lack of historical prices.

Since the bond market and stock market are not well-developed in China, many firms
obtain capital through the following ways5:
1.

Domestic bank loan

2.

Firms’ self-fundraising

3.

State budget

4.

Foreign direct investment

5

Allen, Franklin, Douglas Gale and Meijun Qian (2008). “China’s Financial System: Past,
Present, and Future,” Chapter 14 in China’s Great Economic Transformation, L. Brandt and T.
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Of these four channels, self-fundraising and bank loans are the largest areas in which
firms obtain capital. Self-fundraising may involve private investors, but this market is not
structured. Private investors could invest through non-standard channels through firms’ selffundraising, but if a person does not have a private connection to some firm that needs
fundraising, he will have a lot of difficulty investing in these firms.

China’s foreign currency reserve has been growing steadily since 2003. China has
become the country with the largest U.S. dollar reserve: $2.65 trillion6 as of September 2010,
with a large fraction of the U.S. dollar denominated assets help in form of T-bills or notes.
While the foreign currency reserves grew in China, the exchange rate of the Chinese RMB has
been held fixed to the U.S. dollar with the exception of a short period between July 2005 and
July 2008, and recently when the United States and Eurozone have been putting pressure on
China to appreciate the RMB.

There are several reasons for China’s insistence on a fixed RMB-Dollar exchange rate.
Although China has grown rapidly in the past decades, it is still a developing country. The RMB
was initially pegged to the U.S. dollar to maintain credibility of the Chinese RMB7. Perhaps the
U.S. dollar is not a good choice for China to peg its currency, but it may be the best choice.
China’s economy has been growing at double-digit rates for more than a decade. Given the size
6

"Country Comparison: Reserves of Foreign Exchange and Gold." Welcome to the CIA Web Site
— Central Intelligence Agency. Web. 26 Oct. 2010.
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2188rank.html>.
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of China’s current economy, there are only three large advanced economies China could fix its
RMB exchange rate to: United States, Japan, and the Eurozone. The global financial crisis has
revealed that European banks are in worse form than their American counterparts, and corporate
debts are higher in Europe than those in the United States. Most Eurozone countries including
larger economic powers such as Italy, Germany, Spain, and France have higher levels of public
debt, as a percentage of their respective GDP, than the United States (Figure 3). Pegging the
RMB to the Eurozone would not provide the stability China desires.

Although Japan has been the world’s second largest economy after the United States
since 1968 until recently, Japan’s economy is still recovering from the catastrophic crash in the
early 1990s. Rising real estate and stock prices caused the Japanese economy to overheat in the
late 1980s, forming the famous Japanese asset price bubble. Japan had a hard landing as this
bubble came to an abrupt end in 1989 as the Tokyo Stock Exchange crashed and the real estate
prices peaked in 1991. Japan’s economy has been in shambles since then, growing at an annual
rate of 1.5% throughout the 1990s. Hence, Japan is not a good choice for China to peg the RMB.
Given the above economic conditions, the United States dollar is the best choice for the China to
peg its RMB.

Additionally, the Chinese government does not have much experience with a floating
exchange rate. Throughout the past few decades, coinciding with the fixed exchange rate regime
was the rapid growth of the Chinese economy. The Chinese government may infer from this that
a fixed exchange rate of the RMB is beneficial for China. On July 21 2005, China announced it
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has moved to “a managed floating exchange rate regime based on market supply and demand
with reference to a basket of currencies.”8 The Chinese RMB appreciated from 8.28RMB/USD
in May of 2005 to 6.84 in July of 2008, when the financial crisis was imminent. Through this
series of events, the Chinese government again sees fixed exchange rate to be positive and
floating exchange rate to be negative as the floating RMB regime ended in the financial crisis.
The Chinese government has seen what a fixed exchange rate did to the Chinese economy,
associating it with the Chinese economic boom, but does not know what a floating rate system
will do for the Chinese economy in the future. The government may be reluctant to switch to a
floating exchange rate due to its unfamiliarity to the new system and the uncertainties associated
with this unfamiliarity. The only experiment with a relatively hands-off RMB exchange rate
ended badly. Currently although China claims its RMB exchange rate is floating with a
reference to a basket of currencies, it is heavily controlled managed float at best.

Perhaps most importantly, China is still highly reliant on exports for its rapid economic
growth. An appreciating Chinese RMB means relatively more expensive Chinese goods, leading
to lower levels of exports. Lower levels of exports can have strong negative effects on the
Chinese economy. The lightest consequence would lead to instability of small to medium sized
exporters, and more serious consequences could include slower growth of the overall Chinese
economy. For the above reasons, China has kept its RMB fixed to the U.S. dollar for the
majority of the past decade. Fixing the RMB/USD exchange rate led to an increase in base

8
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currency liquidity, which leads to increases in investment and as a result the rising prices in
investment vehicles, furthering the boom in the real estate market.

A final factor contributing to the rise of the Chinese real estate market is loose monetary
policy. Totaling bank reserves and deposits, there are 70 trillion RMB in China. To put this
amount in perspective, China’s $2.65 trillion U.S. dollar reserve is approximately equivalent to
17.7 trillion RMB at the current exchange rate (6.68¥/$) – barely more than a quarter of the
amount of RMB in China! Unlike the U.S. dollar which is accepted widely around the world, the
Chinese RMB is only widely accepted within the borders of China. Such a large amount of
RMB in circulation must be allocated somewhere: Investors are looking for ways to invest their
money, and the real estate market has looked attractive since 2002.

All in all, the Chinese market is not as developed as advanced economies such as the
United States. In fact, it is small compared to many emerging economies. There are limited
ways people can invest money in China, therefore a higher proportion of investments are poured
into the housing market compared to the United States. To add to this, money from inside and
outside of China is being poured into the real estate market like never before. Between 2002 and
2006, many Chinese investors flocked to the real estate market to invest. In this time, Chinese
real estate prices skyrocketed.

Page 8

Figures 4, 5, 6 serve to illustrate the disparity between disposable income and real estate
prices in three large cities: Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen. As shown in the figures, in these
large cities the disposable annual income growth has grossly lagged the growth in real estate
prices. Of the three, Shenzhen seems to have the most diverging prices between disposable
income and real estate prices: By the end of 2009, the real estate prices in Shenzhen were
approximately four times the disposable income. This ratio for the end of 2009 is lightly lower
for Beijing and Shanghai, at around 1.7 for both cities. It is interesting to note that overall
China’s national average real estate price seems to be growing at similar rates as the national
average disposal income, even through the global financial crisis period (Figure 7).

Government Response
Faced with the unique situation of its real estate market, the Chinese government has
implemented a series of policies since 2003 to pose restrictions on the real estate market. These
measures are taken in attempts to stabilize the real estate market. The Chinese government
wishes to stabilize the real estate market prices through increased supply at the lower end and
decreased demand at the higher end. If this is successful, there will be more transactions at the
lower end of the market and fewer transactions at the higher end, allowing the prices to adjust
accordingly.

Perhaps the most urgent problem is that the real estate prices in China have become so
high that many people who need housing for practical living purposes cannot afford to purchase
a home. Luxury apartments in Beijing are selling for more than ¥100 000 per square meter (the
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apartment roughly costs ¥20 million), while the typical monthly income for a white-collar
worker is only a few thousand yuan. Even real estate aimed at these middle-class income earner
are marked anywhere from a few thousand yuan per square meter to fifty or sixty thousand yuan
per square meter.

The Chinese government has taken the initiative to increase the supply of lower-end
housing in an attempt to solve the problem of low-income people not being able to afford
housing at all. Chinese experts agree that promotion of low-income housing by local
governments is one of the key factors in curbing China’s rising real estate prices. The
government strives to increase affordable housing, low-cost housing, public rental housing,
price-limited housing, and other construction of affordable housing. Chinese government
encourages commercial banks to provide loans to the development of low-income housing and
develop policies that support public rental housing construction with medium-to-long term loans.
Increases in the construction of low-income housing will help to deter speculation in China’s real
estate market and therefore help cool down the rising real estate prices in China.

According to Hou Ximin, an official from the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural
Development, as the end of August China had begun building 4.1 million low-income housing
units which accounts for seventy percent of the full-year plan, and invested 470 billion RMB
($70 billion), equivalent to sixty percent of the full-year plan9. Also part of the initiative, China
9

"Low-income Housing Key to Curb Rising Home Prices." China Daily Website - Connecting
China Connecting the World. Web. 27 Oct. 2010.
<http://www2.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2010-10/04/content_11376996.htm>.
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plans to build 3 million low-cost rental housing units, transform 2.8 million housing units found
in shanty towns, and renovate 1.2 million dilapidated rural houses by the end of 2010. This is
the most ambitious task China has undertaken in recent years. Most of the implementation of
these policies will be at the local government level, who will shoulder the responsibility to
guarantee low-income housing is properly constructed to meet the basic needs of the residents.
Chinese central government officials are urging local governments to adopt stricter measures to
ensure the overall targets are met.

To control for the massive demand for housing, the Chinese government has
implemented various restrictions on ownership of multiple properties. Healthy demand is not an
issue, but of the total demand for housing, a big portion is speculative. Since 2004, the Chinese
government’s policies have been focused on reducing speculative activities in the real estate
market. Most of these restrictions are set on banks’ lending policies. The policies include the
following10:

1. Increase People’s Bank of China’s required reserve deposit ratio, to discourage
excessive lending from banks to finance housing
2. Increased equity down payments shares from 20% to 30% for first homes of more
than 90 square meters in size
10

Clarke, Donald, Peter Murrell, and Susan Whiting (2008). “Law, Property Rights and
Institutions,” Chapter 11 in China’s Great Economic Transformation, L. Brandt and T. Rawski,
Eds., Cambridge University Press.
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3. Increased equity down payment shares from 40% to 50% for second homes
4. Discouragement of the use of any leverage on third homes or by external buyers –
those not living in the market of the intended purpose
5. New rules to prevent developers from hoarding housing units
6. Preparation of the introduction of a local properties tax, with possible pilot
implementations in Chongqing, a large city under direct control of the central
government, within one or two years.

There are also rules for increasing mortgage interest rates as an investor purchases
multiple properties. For a purchase of a second piece of property, the mortgage on that second
property may be ten to twenty percent higher than the loan on the first property. As mentioned
above, banks are generally discouraged from approving a mortgage on the third property,
especially in major cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, or Shenzhen where real estate prices have
recently risen very quickly. Mortgage on a third property may be approved on a case by case
basis in cities where real estate prices have not increased as quickly as those in major cities. If
the loan is approved, the interest rate on the mortgage is 1.5 times higher than the interest rate on
the first property. The proposed property tax could play a significant role in cooling down the
real estate market, since it would raise the cost of carry on speculative investment.

Perhaps the Chinese real estate market has been diverging in two directions since 2002
when consumers’ perception of real estate as legitimate investments solidified. Two prices
appeared: A lower price for practical-use housing and a much higher price for investment
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housing. The Chinese government is trying to increase the supply of practical-use housing and
decrease the demand for investment housing. This effort serves to narrow the gap between the
two diverging prices in the real estate market and in turn stabilizes real estate prices.

Problems
Real estate market affects many other areas of the economy. A boom in the real estate
market means increased construction which in turn means increased demand for areas such as
basic materials, construction labor, interior decoration labor, and real estate agents. As the real
estate market quickly expands, its effect on these various other industries gains more weight,
especially on the financial and banking industries. Financial institutions such as banks must
keep lending to keep up with the demand for financing for housing. If China’s real estate growth
suddenly comes to a halt, Chinese financial institutions will be negatively affected, among other
industries which have become dependent on the real estate market to fuel the demand for their
services in the past decade.

While the premise of government policies is beneficial, the actual implementation of the
policies may meet some resistance due to diverging goals for the central government and housing
developers. While the central government wants to solve the lower-end housing supply problem,
the housing developers’ compensation is linked to the monetary value of their projects. In other
words, building lower-end housing means lower income for construction companies and housing
contractors. People who directly benefit from building high-price property may not be willing to
take low-end housing projects.
Page
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Various government agencies and officials have played a major role in developing
commercial real estate and it is not in their best interest to see major market corrections. Some
support of this view is provided in Wu et al11. They find that much of the increase in housing
prices is occurring in land values. Using land auctions data from Beijing, they also find SOEs
controlled by the central government paid 27% more than other bidders for an otherwise
equivalent land parcel. Since many government officials have a lot to lose following a crash in
the real estate markets, it is argued that the new measures, including the proposed property taxes,
will not be effectively enforced; such belief can also explain why speculative capital continues to
pour into the real estate markets.

Despite central government efforts to stabilize real estate prices, there is another major
force acting against the central government – the provincial and local governments. This may
first seem contradictory to the political landscape of China where the central government rules
the local governments, but becomes clear when one considers the incentives for each. Every
year, provincial governments have to submit budgets to the central government planning the
public expenses. For wealthier coastal provinces such as Guangdong, the provincial government
has plenty of money from taxes to carry out necessary spending. However, for relatively poor
provinces in central and western China, annual budgets can be a headache due to lower tax
revenues. Unlike their American counterparts, Chinese provincial and local governments cannot

11

Wu, Jing, Joseph Gyourko, and Yongsheng Deng, (2010). “Evaluating Conditions in Major
Chinese Housing Markets”, Working Paper, University of Pennsylvania.
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issue their own debt. Since land is publically owned, one key way for these provinces to
generate more revenue is through leasing out the land for private constructions. Similarly, local
governments also lease land in similar manners. As the demand for land increases, the price of
land increases as well. Of course, the demand for land rises as the real estate prices increase and
increasingly many developers fight over limited land. This creates a vicious cycle: The rising
prices of the land leads to higher real estate prices, which in turn lead to higher land values. The
provincial and local governments benefit from all of this. More expensive lands means the
provincial and local governments can earn higher revenues. This creates conflicting incentives
between the Chinese central government and provincial governments: Central government wish
to stabilize real estate prices, but provincial and local governments want real estate prices to keep
rising. Perhaps then it is no surprise that many central government policies to control real estate
prices have been met with resistance at lower levels.

Even if Chinese government policies did not meet counter-acting forces, they may
produce mixed effects for the real estate market. Government intervention of the real estate
market undermines the natural market mechanisms in the market. The Chinese government
seems to have forgotten that the primary reason for the success of the Chinese economic reforms
that have occurred in the past thirty years were to allow for a more competitive environment and
the existence of self-adjusting markets, instead of relying on central-planning. The success of
the Chinese economic reform in those years lies in the elimination of government intervention,
such as the case of Wenzhou, where the region’s private economy allowed the region to grow
dramatically faster than under central governance. Government intervention caused the prices in
the real estate market to be stiff, not able to adjust according to market mechanisms.
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There are important differences between the high prices in the Chinese real estate market
and the high prices resulted from a bubble in the real estate market in the United States. In the
United States, the real estate bubble was caused by homeowner speculation, but more
importantly caused by changes in lending practices. Businesses are driven by profits, and
logically attempted to circumvent the existing rules and regulations in an effort to maximize
profits. Lending institutions traditionally originated mortgage loans to the borrower and retained
the credit default risk. This traditional model has given way to “originate-to-distribute” models,
in which banks sell off the mortgages in tranches and distribute the credit risk to investors who
purchase these mortgage tranches. “Originate-to-distribute” models adopted by lending
institutions changed the incentives of banks. Instead of carefully screening the borrowers’ credit
histories and backgrounds, banks would make loans to those with bad credit history since they
could later transfer the risk to investors. As a result, more loans than warranted were given out
in a period of economic prosperity. An increase in the number of approved loans lead to an
increase in the demand for real estate, which lead to higher prices in the real estate market. In
China, there is too much government regulation attempting to control real estate prices. The real
estate market then cannot self-adjust to the appropriate market price. Since the rapid increase in
real estate prices, the overall demand for housing has declined since many middle to lower-class
citizens simply cannot afford to purchase real estate in many areas. This decline in demand
should lower the overall prices in the real estate market based on the laws of supply and demand.
However, the prices do not seem to fall. Perhaps this is because there are also many investors
who rush into the real estate market as the prices increase, or perhaps the real estate prices may
be kept up due to the fact the market prices cannot adjust according to market conditions.
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There is also a major problem with the government’s initiative to increase supply of lowend housing: There is no written definition of what type of housing categorizes as low-end
affordable housing. Perhaps this is because it will be a difficult task categorizing specifically
what type of housing would be considered low-end. China is a diverse country with many
varieties of smaller-scale real estate activities, and it is difficult if not impossible to
quantitatively determine the price cutoff for “low-end” housing. However, the lack of definition
directly affects the effectiveness of the government policies, and confuses the consumers’
understanding and expectations from the real estate market. A lack of definitions also
undermines market mechanisms by crowding out private developers since many projects are
carried out by the government, and private developers may be reluctant to take on low-end
housing projects if there is no government subsidy. This influences the prices set by the market.
Also, the capital allocated towards lower-end housing may not be the best of that capital – the
efficiently of investments in the real estate market is compromised; the return on investment on
the money invested in lower-end housing will obviously be lower than if the capital were used on
investments that yield higher returns. Lastly, with any government initiatives intervening with
the market, it is difficult for the central government to estimate how much of this lower-end
housing is actually needed.

The central government must remove any policies that restrict investments or hold back
consumption in order to allow market mechanisms to operate properly. The Chinese real estate
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market has too much government interference. Even before the recent global financial crisis, the
Chinese real estate market was already very problematic.

In 2008 the real estate prices slumped as a result of the global financial crisis. This was
the biggest major slump since 1998 Asian crisis. Faced with the economic downturn, Chinese
government decided to pursue active fiscal policies and relatively loose monetary policy to
counter the downturn. However, the attitude towards the real estate market is ambivalent, since
the real estate sector pulls investments, increases domestic demand, and generally allows the
Chinese market to continue to grow. On one hand, the Chinese government wishes for the real
estate market to recover from the slump as quickly as possible through stimulus plans. On the
other hand, the government is also worried about the continued increase in real estate prices if
policies over-stimulates, leading to ever-higher real estate prices. Consumers who purchase
homes for practical purposes want the downward real estate price trend to continue for housing
to become more affordable.

2008 was a dangerous year for China and its real estate market. Demand spilling over
from 2007 lead to a great many construction projects in 2008, but many of those projects which
started construction did not proceed according to plan; they either stopped completely or
postponed due to the global financial crisis. In 2007 China sold 770 million square meters of
commercial space, in 2009 it sold about 20% less. Without capital to invest, there will be
buildings that will be started but never will be finished.
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The slump in real estate prices in 2008 also meant financial institutions were hurt. In a
financial crisis, if companies are short on cash and cannot lower their prices – lowering prices
would lead to losses that would hurt the companies further – they must surrender their assets,
often in the form of property, to the bank. Since the real estate values declined, banks are worse
off auctioning off the property, and the government would collection less taxes as a result.

In the end, the Chinese government did resort to a generous stimulus package valued at 4
trillion RMB, Of the 4 trillion RMB, 2.7 trillion RMB was poured into nationwide real estate
development12. 900 million RMB was used to invest in affordable, lower-end housing. This not
only ensures increased opportunities for people who demand practical housing, but also stimulate
domestic consumption by creating new demand (if people can’t afford housing, they don’t buy
it). It is part of China’s “Expand domestic consumption, increase investments” policy.
However, government stimulus package is only good for the economy in the short term when the
economy needs an immediate lift. In the long term, private investment and consumptions are
what lead to growth. This large stimulus package may have been more than what China needed.

Summary and Concluding Remarks
China’s economy has grown at amazing speeds for well over a decade. Given the rising
status of the Chinese economy and the relative stagnant growths of the United States, among
other developed countries, Chinese assets have become attractive investments for foreign
12

"China Property Stimulus Plan Targets Low-Income Housing, Ownership." Window of China.
Xinhua, 17 Dec. 2008. Web. 27 Oct. 2010. <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/200812/17/content_10519111.htm>.
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investors. There is some evidence of speculative foreign capital flowing into China which may
have helped fuel the accelerated rising prices in the real estate market. Although like many other
markets, the Chinese real estate market was affected by the global financial crisis, the resilience
of the Chinese economy has convinced many investors that the Chinese real estate market
remains to hold attractive investment opportunities. In the foreseeable future, it seems that
foreign investments in the Chinese real estate market will not slow down.

As mentioned earlier, although the real estate prices in major cities such as Beijing,
Shanghai, and Shenzhen are growing much faster than the disposable annual income, the overall
national real estate prices growth and the disposable income growth do not look divergent. The
real estate prices in the major cities are growing more rapidly than the national average, this may
be due to large amounts of foreign investment and a disproportionally higher percentage of
upper-class citizens than the national average. If the supply and demand in these cities are
balanced, then the rapid growth in real estate prices could be justified. Otherwise, the rapid real
estate price increase could mostly be attributed to speculative capital.

Finally, what does the future hold for the Chinese real estate market? Above all, the
continuing development of the Chinese economy rests on economic stability. The continual rise
of the Chinese real estate prices will cause increasingly many economic distortions, such as the
problem lower-class citizen face when they cannot afford basic housing. However, a sudden
collapse in the real estate market is surely disastrous for the Chinese economy. Many sectors
would be negatively affected; many jobs would be lost. Investors would lose confidence and
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withdraw capital. The Chinese government must seek out the delicate balance between fully
supporting the real estate market and imposing severe restrictions to keep prices down, which
may lead to a crash in the real estate market. Perhaps the best approach is to implicitly back the
real estate market as to not let it collapse in the case of a crisis, but at the same time taking
precautions in controlling the rapid increases in price to minimize the economic distortions.
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Figure 1 (Source: World Bank)
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Year

China

World

US

1998

22.7

91.2

154.7

1999

30.5

118.1

180.5

2000

48.5

102.2

154.7

2001

39.5

89.3

137.5

2002

31.9

72.3

106.5

2003

41.5

87.4

130.8

2004

33.1

92

138.2

2005

34.6

96.7

134.9

2006

89.3

110.1

145.7

2007

177.6

118.9

142.4

2008

61.6

58.6

81.7

2009

100.5

80.8

105.8

Table 1. Market capitalization as percentage of GDP
(Source: World Bank)
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